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Two-sided marketsWestudy thewelfare effect of a quantity restriction on advertising in free-to-air television (and other advertising
ﬁnanced media) in the presence of commercial media bias. Broadcasters face a trade-off between increasing the
number of viewers by sending content that is highly valued by viewers, and increasing the price of advertising by
choosing advertiser friendly content. A cap on advertising drives the per-viewer price of ads up; thus, content
improves for viewers. Therefore, the cap can be welfare enhancing, even when viewers are not ad averse.
Competition among broadcasters makes it more likely that a cap on advertising improves welfare. Thus, there
is a complementarity between regulation and competition on thismarket.We also show that a tax on advertising
revenues has quite different effects than a cap on advertising quantity.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
It is widely agreed that a free and independent media is impor-
tant for society and democracy. While the independence of media
can be endangered from many directions, recent discussions both
in academia and policy circles have shown that commercial media
bias is an important concern. Commercial media bias arises out of aren Blomquist, Martin Barbie,
tthew Ellman, Matthias Heinz,
Löbbing, Frank May, Sebastian
ünster, Susanne Prantl, Andrea
minars in Cologne, Dortmund,
rcher Workshop in Mannheim
a Bias (University of Hamburg
nts and discussion. Errors are
tus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln,
. Kerkhof),
. This is an open access article underconﬂict of interest between advertisers and audiences over media
content. Studies from marketing have shown that advertisers prefer
lighter content and genres that put consumers in a more advertising
receptive mood.1 Moreover, advertisers may prefer the media not to
report critically about their products.2 There are indications that the
topic of commercial media bias has become especially important in
recent years. The FCC (2011) has reported worries about the “crum-
bling ad-edit wall” in broadcast television: due to their difﬁcult ﬁnancial1 For example,Wilbur (2008, p. 373) ﬁnds that “advertiser genre preferences are nearly
opposite those of viewers” : viewers prefer action and news, while advertisers prefer real-
ity and comedy. A case in point is that Coca-Cola and General Foods have refused to adver-
tise during news broadcasts, as “bad” news might affect consumers’ perception of their
products (Hawkins and Mothersbaugh, 2009).
2 For example, tobacco advertisers have pressured media outlets to suppress informa-
tion concerning the health risks of smoking. Blasco and Sobbrio (2012) provide a survey
of the evidence.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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pressures.3
This paper investigates the welfare effects of limits for the quantity
of advertising in a commercial free-to-air televisionmarket in thepresence
of commercial media bias. Since free-to-air broadcasters do not collect
direct payments from their audiences, they may be especially susceptible
to advertisers' inﬂuence. In our model, broadcasters choose the quality of
their program for the viewers and the quantity of advertising. The conﬂict
of interest between viewers and advertisers gives rise to a trade-off:
making the programmore attractive for viewers increases the number of
viewers, but lowers the willingness to pay of the advertisers. Ceteris
paribus, a cap on advertising quantity will drive the per-viewer price of
advertising up since the inverse ad demand is decreasing in quantity. A
higher per-viewer price of advertisingmakes it more proﬁtable for broad-
casters to attract additional viewers. Therefore, the non-advertising
program content of the media will become more aligned with viewers'
preferences.
This result may help to understand cross-country differences in
television content. News belong to the viewers' (but not advertisers')
most preferred television genres (Wilbur, 2008). We would therefore
expect that the supply of news is higher when advertising quantity is
restricted, and indeed Aalberg et al. (2010) show that the supply of
news and current affairs by the biggest commercial broadcasters during
prime time is drastically higher in several European countries, where
advertising quantity is restricted, than in the USA, where it is not.4
A quantity restriction on advertising increases consumer surplus
but decreases producer surplus. We study the conditions under which
welfare (which we take to be the sum of consumer surplus and all
proﬁts) increases. In particular, due to its effect on media content, a
cap may improve welfare even when consumers do not directly suffer
from advertising or can easily avoid ads by the use of ad avoidance
technologies such as digital video recorders (DVRs).
Competition between many independently owned broadcasters
helps overcoming commercial media bias. Surprisingly, it increases at
the same time the likelihood that a cap on advertising improveswelfare.
Therefore, competition and regulation of advertising should not be seen
as substitutes; rather, they complement each other. The key reason
for the complementarity is as follows. A cap that marginally reduces
advertising quantity crowds out the marginal advertisers. The asso-
ciated loss in producer surplus depends on the willingness to pay of
the marginal advertisers, which in equilibrium equals the price of an
advertising spot. Competition on the media market decreases this
price. Correspondingly, the marginal advertiser has a lower willingness
to pay, and the loss in producer surplus from a cap is lower.3 For example, the FCC (2011) describes the case of a local Fox channel, KBTC-TV, which
featured a story on a new electronic rehabilitation system for injured kids. The reporter
was introduced to the audience in a way that suggested an independent report by the
channel. The reporter did not work for KTBC, however, but for the Cleveland Clinic.
Liebermann (2007) reports that this is not an isolated case: “a hybrid of news andmarket-
ing (…) has spread to local TV newsrooms all across the country (…). Viewers who think
they are getting news are really getting a formof advertising. And critical stories – hospital
infection rates, for example, or medical mistakes or poor care – tend not to be covered.”
Recent academic contributions on commercial media bias include Reuter and Zitzewitz
(2006), Ellman and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013); we review the lit-
erature in Section 2. The issue has also recently raised the interest of the FTC,which hosted
a workshop on the “blurred lines” between advertising and content in December 2013.
4 Aalberg et al. (2010) compare the two biggest commercial broadcasters in each of ﬁve
European countrieswith the twobiggest commercial broadcasters in theUSA.Duringpeak
hours, in 2007, the biggest two commercial broadcasters in the USA devoted an average of
6 minutes a day on news and current affairs. In comparison, the biggest two commercial
broadcasters in Belgium provided 42 minutes, in the Netherlands 20 minutes, in Norway
19 minutes, in Sweden 27 minutes, and in the UK 37 minutes. Of course, there are many
differences between these European countries and the USA. The authors stress the higher
importance of public service broadcasting in Europe. Within countries, public service
broadcasters have a higher news supply than commercial broadcasters; across countries,
the biggest public service broadcasters in the European countries showmore news during
prime time than those in the USA.The complementarity between regulation and competition is thus
tightly linked to the effect of competition on advertising prices. Empiri-
cally, it seems that competition on the broadcasting market reduces
advertising prices (see Brown and Alexander, 2005). As has been point-
ed out by Athey et al. (2013, p. 6) and Anderson et al. (2012), this poses
a puzzle in media economics since standard models of free TV give the
opposite prediction: competition between broadcasters for viewers
decreases advertising quantities since viewers are ad averse and there-
by increases advertising prices. Ourmodel provides a potential explana-
tion for the empirical results. Strong competition among broadcasters
leads to lowadvertising quantities, but also to viewer friendly programs.
Other things being equal, the reduction of advertising quantity increases
advertising prices, as in the standard models. A more viewer friendly
program, however, lowers the advertisers' willingness to pay and thus
equilibrium advertising prices.We show that the latter effect dominates
the former one.
Ourmodel also contributes to understanding the “crumbling ad-edit
wall” diagnosed by someobservers of today'smediamarkets. In times of
low ad demand, for example, due to advertisersmoving online or due to
general economic conditions, the price of an ad per viewer is lower.
Therefore, attracting viewers is less important for the broadcasters.
As a consequence, in equilibrium media content will be more aligned
with advertiser preferences.
A cap on advertising lowers broadcasters' proﬁts and may thus
induce exit and a higher concentration on the media market. We
show, however, that our main results are qualitatively similar when
taking endogenous entry into account. In particular, a “local” cap (that
slightly reduces advertising quantity) improves consumer surplus and
is more likely to be welfare enhancing when competition is ﬁerce. In
contrast, a proportional tax on advertising revenues has rather different
implications than a cap. The reason is that a cap reduces advertising
quantity while a tax increases it in the long run. Marginal costs are
zero in television markets. A tax on advertising revenue is therefore a
tax on variable proﬁts, and for a given number of broadcasters, equilib-
rium decisions are unchanged. The tax lowers broadcasters' proﬁts,
however, and thus induces exit, and the reduced competition leads to
an increase of advertising quantity.
Our paper contributes to two classic topics in public ﬁnance, the
private provision of public goods, and the comparison of price versus
quantity instruments, in the speciﬁc setting of advertising ﬁnanced
media. Media markets are of general interest since the working of
these markets not only affects their active participants but also gener-
ates important externalities, for example, by helping citizens to take
well-informedpolitical decisions. For an adequate analysis, the structure
ofmediamarkets needs to bemodelled inmore detail than is customary
in the theory of public goods. We thus build on modeling tools devel-
oped in the economic analysis of advertising and in the theory of two-
sided markets, which is a comparatively new topic in public ﬁnance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
background by reviewing (i) the empirical literature on the inﬂuence
of advertisers on media content, (ii) the conﬂict of interest between
viewers and advertisers, (iii) the regulation of television advertising,
and (iv) the related literature. Section 3 gives a simple and highly styl-
ized example that illustrates the main effects in our model. Section 4
introduces the model, brieﬂy mentions its microfoundations (which
are presented in detail in Section 2 of the Online Appendix), and
discusses the assumptions underlying our welfare analysis. Section 5
characterizes the equilibrium and its welfare properties, investigates
the welfare effects of a cap, determines the welfare maximizing cap
without and with endogenous entry in the broadcasting market, and
discusses advertising taxes. Section 6 studies Pay TV and ad avoidance
technologies. Section 7 summarizes our ﬁndings, discusses robustness
issues and extensions (laid out in detail in the Online Appendix), and
brieﬂy mentions the testable predictions of the model. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix, and some lengthy technical proofs to the
Online Appendix.
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2.1. Ads inﬂuence editors
Many media platforms depend heavily on advertising revenues. For
example, the 2014 Pew report on the state of the newsmedia ﬁnds that
advertising accounts for 69% of US news revenues (Pew Research
Center, 2014). At the same time, media reports about ﬁrms and their
products inﬂuence proﬁts.5 Themedia's dependence on advertising rev-
enues, combined with its impact on ﬁrms' proﬁts, implies that adver-
tisers have economic incentives to inﬂuence editorial decisions.
Several recent papers have shown econometrically that indeed adver-
tisers systematically inﬂuence media content.6 Advertisers' inﬂuence
on media content can be expected to be especially strong in solely ad-
vertising fundedmedia such as free TV or radio broadcasting. Moreover,
the difﬁcult ﬁnancial situation of the newsmedia today afﬂicts the qual-
ity of news coverage (Pew Research Center, 2013) and has led to a re-
consideration of the traditional separation between media companies'
news and business divisions (FCC, 2011).2.2. Conﬂict of interest between viewers and advertisers
At the center of our model is a conﬂict of interest between viewers
and advertisers overmedia content. Here we discuss the empirical liter-
ature that motivates this assumption. First, there is good evidence that
viewers favor different genres than advertisers. Wilbur (2008) esti-
mates a two-sided empirical model of viewer demand for programs
and advertiser demand for audiences. In his data, viewers' two most
preferred programs are action and news, accounting for 16% of program
network hours, whereas advertisers' two most preferred programs are
reality and comedy, accounting for 47% of program network hours. His
results suggest that advertisers' preferences have a bigger impact on
the networks than the viewers' preferences. Similarly, Brown and
Cavazos (2005, p. 30) ﬁnd that “broadcast television programs receive
large and statistically signiﬁcant premia or discounts based on their con-
tent, holding constant the number, income, age and gender of the
viewers these programs attract. Sitcoms receive large premia, while
news shows and police dramas receive large discounts.” In their sample,
adjusting for the length of these program types, sitcoms airedmore than
one-and-a-half time more often than news shows and police dramas
combined.
A potential explanation for advertisers' genre preferences is provided
by the experimental research concerning context effects on advertising
effectiveness. Goldberg and Gorn (1987) show that happier program
content puts viewers in a more advertising receptive mood. Relatedly,
Mathur and Chattopadhyay (1991) ﬁnd that it improves viewers' mes-
sage recall aswell as their cognitive responses towards the commercials.
Advertisers take these issues seriously. Hawkins and Mothersbaugh
(2009, p. 298) report that “Coca-Cola and General Foods have refused
to advertise some goods during news broadcasts because they believe
that ‘bad’ news affect the interpretation of their products. According to
a Coca-Cola spokesman: ‘It's a Coca-Cola policy not to advertise on TV
news because there is going to be some bad news in there, and Coke is
an up-beat, fun product.’”
A second issue is that viewers but not advertisersmay favor accurate
reporting of any defects, risks, or negative externalities of products (for a
review, see Blasco and Sobbrio, 2012, and Online Appendix Section 2).
An important andwell-documented case in point is the media coverage
of the health risks of smoking. Another important case is the media
coverage of anthropogenic climate change, where the discourse in the5 See Online Appendix, Section 2, for empirical references.
6 The seminal contribution is Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006). See Table 1 in theOnline Ap-
pendix for an overview of econometric evidence. Aswe describe in Section 1 of the Online
Appendix, interviews and surveys of key players in the market also conﬁrm that adver-
tisers inﬂuence media content.news media has signiﬁcantly diverged from the scientiﬁc consensus.
As pointed out by Ellman and Germano (2009), one potential reason
behind this biased media coverage is the inﬂuence of big advertisers
such as car manufacturers or airlines.
2.3. Regulation of TV advertising
The regulation of the quantity of advertising in television differs
markedly across countries. In the European Union, for example, the
Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires that the “proportion of
television advertising spots and teleshopping spots within a given
clock hour shall not exceed 20% ” (Article 23 § 1.). In contrast, in the
United States there are no such rules, except for children's programs.
Economic theory has identiﬁed two countervailing considerations
concerning the welfare effects of limits for the quantity of advertising
(Anderson and Coate, 2005): On the one hand, broadcasters are often
competitive bottlenecks and have market power over advertisers,
suggesting that advertising quantity may be too low from a welfare
perspective, for the usual reason why ﬁrms with market power restrict
quantities below the efﬁcient level. On the other hand, consumers may
have a disutility from advertising, suggesting that there may be too
much advertising in free TV since the free TV broadcasters cannot
perfectly internalize the effect of advertising on their viewers.7 Indeed,
regulation authorities describe protecting consumers as the most
important function of the quantity restrictions (e.g. OFCOM, 2011).
Today consumers can, however, avoid contact with annoying adver-
tisements by the use of ad avoidance technologies such as digital video
recorders (DVRs). In the EU, about 30% of all households already use
such technologies (IP Network, 2013). In the US, 47% of TV households
have at least one digital video recorder (Leichtman Research Group,
2013), and about 23% have DVRs on more than one TV set. The average
US American watches 25 minutes of DVR playback a day (Nielsen,
2013). The traditional argument for quantity restrictions on advertising
may become less compelling under these conditions. Our paper shows
that, however, a cap on advertising makes the non-advertising content
of the media more aligned with viewers' preferences. Therefore, a cap
may increase welfare even if no consumer is directly affected by
advertising.
2.4. Related literature
Our paper is related to four strands of the literature. First, broadcast-
ing is a prime example of the private provision of a public good. For this
reason, our paper contributes to the broad literature on public good
provision (for a review, see Batina and Ihori, 2005). The provision of
public goods via advertising is studied in Luski and Wettstein (1994)
and Anderson and Coate (2005). Our paper goes beyond these papers
by studying advertisers' impact on media content.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on price versus quan-
tity instruments (Weitzman, 1974), aswe compare thewelfare implica-
tions of a tax on advertisingwith the effects of a quantity regulation. Our
contribution to this literature is to focus on a speciﬁc industry, namely,
advertising supported media.
Third, we contribute to the growing work on media bias (for a
survey, see Prat and Strömberg, 2013). The economics' literature has
mainly focussedonpoliticalmedia bias.We focus on advertisers' inﬂuence
and commercial media bias. Our analysis is closely linked to Ellman and
Germano (2009). In their setting, consumers value accurate news, while
advertisers value ad-receptive consumers. They show that a monopoly
newspaper will underreport news that sufﬁciently reduces advertiser
proﬁts. Interestingly, in a newspaper duopoly, commercial media bias
will be eliminated when advertising demand is sufﬁciently high, unless
advertisers are able to commit to withdraw ads from newspapers if they7 Wilbur (2008) estimates that a 10% reduction of advertising quantity in television
leads to a 25% increase in audience size.
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competing horizontally differentiated media outlets to investigate how
media diversity and ownership concentration affect commercial media
bias. Blasco et al. (2014) and Spiteri (2015) show that commercial
media bias is a concern in particular if all advertisers share the same pref-
erences overmedia content, as in the tobacco example,where the tobacco
industry had a shared interest in eliminating coverage of the health risks
of smoking. Otherwise, competition in the productmarketmay help over-
come commercialmedia bias. Blasco and Sobbrio (2012) provide a survey
on competition and commercial media bias. However, the quantity of
advertising chosen by free TV broadcasters, its interaction with program
quality and commercial media bias, and the welfare effects of a cap on
advertising, have not been formally studied yet. The present paper
attempts to close this gap. We ask how a quantity restriction on advertis-
ing inﬂuences commercial media bias, analyze its welfare properties, and
compare the effects of a quantity restriction with those of a tax on adver-
tising revenues.
Our model also relates to the literature on political media bias and
media capture. In some settings, politicians or governments are in fact
major advertisers. Politicians that aim to be (re)elected inform the
voters on their manifestos via canvassing television ads; they prefer
the broadcasters not to report on any scandals or former mistakes that
could reduce their chances. Voters, on the other hand, wish to be prop-
erly informed about the candidates. Suppressed information on politi-
cians can prevent them from making an appropriate choice and hence
lead to distorted political outcomes. Empirical evidence on this mecha-
nism is given by Di Tella and Francescelli (2011), who show in a study of
Argentinian newspapers that government advertising is associatedwith
a reduced coverage of the government's corruption scandals. Moreover,
as reported above, news are among the most preferred genres of
viewers, but not of advertisers. News consumption may have positive
externalities by improving citizens' political decisions, and consumers
will not internalize the large social gains associated with an informed
electorate. Therefore, there could be a demand driven media bias of
too little informative news even without any interference from adver-
tisers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). Commercial media bias against
news aggravates this concern.
Fourth, in order to model advertising supported media adequately,
we build on the literature on advertising (for a survey, see Bagwell,
2007) and two-sided markets (for a survey, see Anderson and
Gabszewicz, 2006). There are three major views in the economic
analysis of advertising. According to the informative view, advertising
provides customers with information about the existence, price, or
qualities of the products. The persuasive view holds that advertising
changes consumers' tastes. The complementary view holds that adver-
tising raises the true utility of the advertised goods. The literature has
ambiguous results onwhether there is toomuch or too little advertising
from awelfare perspective. Moreover, the empirical literature indicates
that no single view captures all the relevant aspects (see Bagwell,
2007). In this paper, we aim to show that a cap on advertising improves
welfare under some conditions. To make our case strong, we take a
rather benign view of advertising andmodel advertising as informative.8
In the theory of two-sidedmarkets, our paper is closely related to the
seminal work of Anderson and Coate (2005), who argue that from a
welfare perspective equilibrium advertising quantities in a two-sided
media market may be too high or too low, mainly depending on con-
sumers' ad aversion. Their model has been extended to a more detailed
analysis of horizontal product differentiation by Peitz and Valletti
(2008). Our model of entry in two-sided markets is related to
Choi (2006) and Crampes et al. (2009). The studies by Ellman and
Germano (2009), Germano and Meier (2013), and Blasco et al. (2014)
discussed above pioneered using models of two-sided markets for the
analysis of commercial media bias. As we compare the welfare8 Section 4.2 discusses the assumptions underlying our welfare analysis in more detail.
In Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix, we also explore the case of misleading advertising.implications of a tax on advertising with the effects of quantity regula-
tion, ourwork is furthermore related to Kind et al. (2008), who examine
taxes in two-sided markets. They study the cases of a monopoly plat-
form, and of perfect competition, assuming that the platforms' marginal
costs are strictly positive, and show that taxes can help to accomplish
the social optimum if the platform causes overprovision. Our paper, in
contrast, focusses on endogenous program quality, and in particular
on commercial media bias, in televisionmarkets, which are typically ol-
igopolistic. Moreover, in television markets marginal costs are negligi-
ble. Thus, revenue taxes are taxes on variable proﬁts and affect entry
but cannot be used to ﬁne-tune economic decisions in the short run. Fi-
nally, our paper can also be linked towork on ad avoidance technologies
(e.g. Anderson and Gans, 2011).
3. Example
In this section, we illustrate the main effects in our model with a
simple and highly stylized example, deferring a more detailed discus-
sion of our assumptions to the next section. In the example, a monopoly
broadcaster chooses its programquality v and its advertising quantity a.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line [0,1], the
broadcaster is located at 0. Consumers have linear travel costs: a viewer
who is located at a distance x ∈ [0,1] from the broadcaster has utility v–x
from watching television. Consumers are ad neutral: their utility from
watching television is independent of the advertising quantity. A
consumer watches television whenever his utility exceeds his outside
option of zero. The total number of consumers is normalized to one;
thus, the number of viewers is simply equal to the program quality v.
To capture the conﬂict of interest between advertisers and viewers,
we assume that advertisers' willingness to pay for advertising spots
decreases in program quality. To be speciﬁc, let r denote the per-viewer
price of an advertising spot, and suppose that the inverse ad demand
per viewer is r= 1− v− a.
The broadcaster is ﬁnanced by advertising, has zero variable costs,
and ﬁxed costs F N 0. To ensure viability of the market, let F b 1/27.
The broadcaster's revenue is equal to the number of viewers, times
the prices of an ad per viewer, times the number of ads; its proﬁt is
π= v(1− v− a)a− F.
For a given advertising quantity a N 0, the proﬁt-maximizing
program quality v is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
1−v−a ¼ v: ð1Þ
Eq. (1) illustrates the fundamental trade-off in our model. The left-
hand side of Eq. (1) describes the marginal gain of the broadcaster
from higher quality, on a per advertising spot basis: higher quality
increases the number of viewers, and on each viewer the broadcaster
earns the price of an ad per viewer. The right-hand side of Eq. (1)
describes the marginal costs of the broadcaster from higher quality,
per advertising spot: higher quality decreases the price of an ad per
viewer, and the loss of revenue is equal to the number of viewers,
which is equal to v in the example.
Solving Eq. (1) for the proﬁt-maximizing program quality gives
v = v* (a) := (1 − a) / 2. Substituting v⁎(a) into the broadcaster's
proﬁt function leads to π= (1− a)2 a / 4− F. Without a cap on ad-
vertising quantity, the proﬁt-maximizing choices of the broadcaster
are a = v = 1/3, resulting in a proﬁt 1/27 − F N 0. If there is a cap
ā b 1/3, the broadcaster's proﬁt-maximizing choices are a = ā and
v = v*(ā), as long as the resulting proﬁt is positive; otherwise, the
broadcaster shuts down.
Note that the proﬁt-maximizing quality increases when a binding
cap is introduced. The reason is straightforward to see from the ﬁrst-
order condition Eq. (1): if the advertising quantity is lower due to a
cap, ceteris paribus the price of an ad per viewer is higher, and this
gives the broadcaster an incentive to increase its quality in order to at-
tract additional viewers.
13 Microfoundations are mentioned in Section 4.3 and discussed in detail in Section 2 of
the Online Appendix.
14 If there is an upper bound v on program quality, one can also think of the standard
model as the casewhereβ=0. Then broadcasters will choose the programquality as high
as possible. In the main part of the paper, we assume that the upper bound on quality is
not binding. We come back to this issue in Section 6.1.
15 One remaining difference is thatwe study a Salopmodelwith a circular town,whereas
Anderson and Coate (2005) consider a linear Hotelling speciﬁcation.
16 In our main model, we assume that a higher program quality reduces the willingness
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We measure consumer surplus by the consumers' aggregate utility
from watching television, CS = ∫0v(v− x)dx. Inserting v⁎(a) shows that
CS = (1 − ā)2/8 is decreasing in ā. Because a cap increases program
quality, consumers are better off, even though they are ad neutral in
our example. On the other hand, the cap decreases producer surplus,
as measured by the area under the per-viewer inverse advertising
demand curve multiplied by the number of viewers. To see this, insert
a= ā and v= v*(ā) into PS = v∫0a(1− v− x)dx to get PS = ā(1− ā)/4,
which is increasing in ā in the relevant range ā ≤ 1/3. Welfare (the
sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus minus ﬁxed costs)
is (1 − ā2)/8 − F and thus decreasing in ā in the relevant range. The
beneﬁts of the consumers from a cap outweigh the losses of producers.
Of course, if the cap is too tight, itwill drive thebroadcaster out of business,
to the detriment of both consumer surplus and producer surplus. The
welfare maximizing cap is as tight as possible, subject to the broadcaster
breaking even.
4. The model
4.1. Economic agents
There areN ≥ 2 advertising fundedmedia outlets. Our prime applica-
tion is to free-to-air television broadcasters, but themodel is also appli-
cable to other advertising funded media, such as radio broadcasting.
Broadcaster i chooses its program quality vi ∈ ℝ and its quantity of
advertising ai ∈ ℝ+. 9 We study a model of a circular town in the spirit
of Salop (1979), this is perhaps the best known textbook model that al-
lows for horizontal product differentiation and a ﬂexible number of
ﬁrms.10 Broadcasters are evenly spaced on a circle with unit circumfer-
ence. Amass n of viewers is uniformly distributed on the circle. Viewers
single home: each viewer watches only one broadcaster.11 The utility of
a viewer located at a distance x from broadcaster i is
wþ vi−δai−τx: ð2Þ
Here,w N 0 is an exogenous parameter sufﬁciently big to ensure the
market is covered in equilibrium; it represents a viewer's utility from a
program located at his ideal point with zero advertising and program
quality. The viewers' utility increases in program quality vi. The para-
meter δ ≥ 0 captures ad aversion; consumers are ad averse when the
parameter δ is strictly positive, and ad neutral when δ =0.12 Transpor-
tation costs are linear with a transportation cost parameter τ N 0, which
can be regarded as a measure of the broadcasters' substitutability; the
lower τ, the easier it is to substitute for broadcaster i's program.
There is a mass m of producers. Each of them produces and adver-
tises one good at constant marginal costs normalized to zero. We refer
to the producers also as the advertisers. Advertising is informative:
consumers are initially unaware of the existence of a good, but become
informed when watching a channel that is airing an ad for the good.9 We take vi from the real numbers to avoid corner solutions which are less interesting
from an economic point of view.
10 In Section 4.1 of the Online Appendix, we show that the main results do not hinge on
speciﬁc features of the Salop circle model. We introduce a more general model of televi-
sion viewing behavior that nests the Salop model and several other textbook models of
discrete choice. We ﬁnd that the conditions under which a local cap improves welfare
are qualitatively similar. Theprecise quantitative implications, however, dependon the as-
sumed model of television viewing.
11 Note that the assumption of single homing viewers makes the case for advertising re-
strictions stronger. Single homing implies that broadcasters havemarket power on the ad-
vertising market and will restrict advertising quantities in order to drive up the price per
ad per viewer. Therefore, as argued by Anderson and Coate (2005), equilibrium advertis-
ing levels may be too low in equilibrium. If we had competition among broadcasters for
advertisers, we would rule out by assumption an important argument why equilibrium
advertising quantities may be too low.
12 In the main model, we assume all viewers dislike ads to the same degree. In order to
investigate the impact of ad avoidance technologies, an extensionwhere consumers differ
in ad aversion is studied in Section 6.2.Producers are characterized by the quality of their goods, denoted
by ~σ. We assume that ~σ is uniformly distributed on [0,σ]. The parameter
σ N 0 corresponds to the highest possible quality of a consumption good.
To model the conﬂict of interest over media content between
viewers and advertisers, we assume that a consumer watching a chan-
nel with quality vi is willing to pay up to ~σ−βvi for a product of quality
~σ , where β N 0. High-quality television program reduces the perceived
beneﬁts of the products, and thus the consumers' willingness to pay
for them. Following Anderson and Coate (2005), we assume that pro-
ducers capture the willingness to pay of the consumer on the product
market. Therefore, the willingness to pay of an advertiser of type ~σ for
informing a viewer who watches broadcaster i is ~σ−βvi, as well. Thus,
viewers' utility increases in vi, while advertisers' willingness to pay de-
creases in vi. In this way, our model captures the conﬂict of interests
over media content between viewers and advertisers.13 The model
combines elements from the classic study of welfare in broadcasting
markets by Anderson and Coate (2005) with ideas from the literature
on commercial media bias. If program quality is exogenous14, our
model is close to Anderson and Coate (2005).15 We take from Ellman
and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013) the assumption
that program quality decreases the willingness to pay of advertisers.16
Advertisers multi-home. Denote the per-viewer price of an ad on
broadcaster i by ri. Assuming σ N βvi + ri ≥ 0, 17 advertising demand is
ai ¼ m Pr ~σ−βviNrið Þ ¼ m 1−βvi þ riσ
 
:
Solving for ri gives inverse ad demand per viewer, which is
ri ¼ σ−βvi− aiσm ; ð3Þ
whenever σ− βvi ≥ aiσ /m; otherwise, inverse ad demand is zero. The
broadcaster's revenue per viewer is riai.
Suppose all broadcasters j ≠ i behave symmetrically, and let u :=
vj − δaj. Moreover, suppose that there is an indifferent viewer located
betweenbroadcaster i and its closest competitors.18Denote the distance
between the indifferent viewer and broadcaster i by x^. Then
vi−δai−τx^ ¼ u−τ
1
N
−x^
 
:to pay of all advertisers by the same amount; that is, advertisers have a shared interest in
reducing program quality. We study the robustness of our results in two extensions.
Section 3.2 in the Online Appendix assumes that only a subset of advertisers has an inter-
est in reducing program quality; this also allows to study sector speciﬁc regulation. In Sec-
tion 4.2 of the Online Appendix, it depends on the quality ~σ of the advertised good how
much the willingness to pay changes with television quality. We ﬁnd that if one plausibly
assumes that thewillingness to pay of producers of high quality is less affected byprogram
quality, the quality enhancing effect of a cap is reinforced.
17 The second inequality ensures we can safely ignore corner solutions where every ad-
vertiser advertises; this will be the case in equilibrium if N ≥ βτ/(σ+ mβδ).
18 This is the case ifu− τ/N b vi− δai b u+ τ/N. If vi− δai b u− τ/N, broadcaster i has no
viewers. If vi− δai N u+ τ/N, broadcaster i is said to undercut its rivals, whichwill not hap-
pen in equilibrium. Due to the linear travel costs, the proﬁt of broadcaster i is discontinu-
ouswhen broadcaster i just undercuts its rivals: if broadcaster i increases its quality and/or
reduces its advertising so much that a viewer whose location is at the location of broad-
caster i + 1 prefers broadcaster i, then broadcaster i gains all the viewers of broadcaster
i + 1, including those located between i + 1 and i + 2. This is a standard property of
the Salop (1979) model with linear transportation costs. We carefully spell out proﬁts
from undercutting in the proofs.
20 Oneway to see this is to calculate the revenues of the advertisers. Recall that themass
m of advertisers is uniformly distributed on [0,σ]. If a is the number of advertising spots,
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fore, the fraction of viewers watching broadcaster i is
2x^ ¼ 1
N
þ vi−δai−u
τ
:
The proﬁt of broadcaster i is
πi ¼ n
1
N
þ vi−δai−u
τ
 
σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
ai−F; ð4Þ
where F N 0 are the ﬁxed costs of operation. In Sections 5.1 to 5.3, we
consider the case where the number of broadcasters is exogenous and
assume that the ﬁxed costs are sufﬁciently small such that broadcasters
make positive proﬁts in equilibrium. Section 5.4 shows that our main
results are robust if we study a model with free entry and endogenize
the number of broadcasters with a zero proﬁt condition.
4.2. Welfare
In the main part of the paper, our welfare analysis assumes that the
willingness to pay of advertisers correctly captures the social beneﬁt of
advertisements. As arguedbyAnderson andCoate (2005), this is a neutral
benchmark case, abstracting away from several countervailing consider-
ations (for a review of the economics of advertising, see also Bagwell,
2007). On the one hand, consumers beneﬁt from informative advertising,
andwhen these gains cannot fully be appropriated by the producers, their
willingness to pay underestimates the welfare gains of advertising
(Shapiro, 1980). On the other hand, if there is competition between pro-
ducers of products, the advertisers' willingness to pay overestimates the
true welfare gains from advertising due to the business stealing effect
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1984).
Moreover, persuasive or misleading advertising may make con-
sumers buy products at a price higher than their “true” utility gains
from them, which is another reason why advertisers' willingness to
pay may overestimate the welfare gains from advertising (Dixit and
Norman, 1978). Incorporating these effects would give additional rea-
sons why a cap on advertising can increase welfare. The literature on
commercial media bias reviewed in Section 2 has argued that there
are empirically large and important externalities from advertising due
to such effects, for example, when the advertised products involve
health risks and the media do not disseminate this information. We
abstract from these considerations in our main model but take them
into account in an extension Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix,
where we show that they make the case for advertising restrictions
stronger.19
Our analysis will focus on symmetric equilibria where all broad-
casters choose the same quantity a and quality v. Then consumer sur-
plus CS is given by
CS ¼ n wþ v−δað Þ− nτ
4N
: ð5Þ
Producer surplus PS is the surplus of the broadcasters and the
advertisers; in other words, PS equals the sum of advertisers' proﬁts,
broadcasters' proﬁts, and ﬁxed costs. In our setting, PS is equal to the
total revenue of the advertisers. PS can be calculated as the area under19 Another interesting benchmark is to be agnostic about the value of advertising, and
therefore to give it no positive or negative weight in the welfare analysis at all (see Peitz
and Valletti, 2008, p. 16). Thenwelfare is a function of programquality alone. A cap on ad-
vertising increases welfare according to this standard if it improves the equilibrium pro-
gram quality. We show this is the case when the number of broadcasters is exogenous,
but need not be the case with free entry.the per-viewer inverse demand curve for advertising spots, multiplied
by the number of viewers:20
PS ¼ n
Z a
0
σ−βv−
σx
m
 
dx: ð6Þ
Total revenues of the broadcasters equal n (σ− βv− σa/m) a, that
is, the number of viewers, times the price of an ad per viewer, times the
number of ads per broadcaster. The proﬁts of the advertisers are the dif-
ference between their revenues and the payments to the broadcasters,
n
Z a
0
σ−βv−
σx
m
 
dx−n σ−βv−
σa
m
 
a ¼ 1
2
a2
m
nσ : ð7Þ
For a given advertising quantity, advertisers' total proﬁts (Eq. (7))
do not depend on program quality. To understand why, note that an
increase in program quality implies a parallel downward shift of the
inverse ad demand function; for advertising quantity to stay constant,
the price of an advertising spot must decrease by the same amount.
Moreover, given advertising quantity, advertisers' total proﬁts (Eq. (7))
is independent of the number of broadcasters N.
Using Eq. (7), Eq. (6) can also be written as
PS ¼ n σ−βv−σa
m
 
a|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Revenues of broadcasters
þ 1
2
a2
m
nσ :|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Profits of advertisers
ð8Þ
This formulation is helpful in the analysis in Section 5.4, where
broadcasters' proﬁts are driven down to zero by free entry, i.e., the
revenue of the broadcasters equals their ﬁxed costs NF.
Finally, welfareW is the sumof consumer surplus and total proﬁts of
broadcasters and advertisers:W= CS + PS− NF.
4.3. Microfoundations
A central assumption of our paper is that thewillingness to pay of an
advertiser for reaching a consumer decreases in the quality of the pro-
gram the viewer watches. Four different microfoundations for this
assumption can be provided. First, for viewers, high-quality television
may be a substitute for consumption, and thus lower their willingness
to pay on the product markets. Second, viewers' recall of an ad may
depend on the program it is embedded in. Third, the television program
may impact the moods of boundedly rational consumers and, thereby,
in turn, their purchase behavior. Fourth, high-quality television may
contain useful information that counteracts deceptive advertising and
thereby lowers consumer demand on the product market. We discuss
thesemicrofoundations inmoredetail in Section2of theOnlineAppendix,
where we also provide references to the underlying empirical literature.
These microfoundations are not mutually exclusive. Great television
programs may at the same time be substitutes for consumption goods,
generate lower attention to and recall of advertisements, inﬂuence
boundedly rational moods, and inform and counteract deceptive adver-
tising. All these microfoundations imply that there is a conﬂict of inter-
est between advertisers and viewers over television content, and lead to
the same positive predictions of the model.21 For normative questions,then themarginal advertiser z is given by (σ – z)m / σ= a, i.e., z= σ – aσ /m. Advertisers
with ~σNz advertise, thosewithσ  bzdo not. The per-viewer revenue of an advertiser of a
type ~σNz is equal to ~σ−βv. Thus, advertisers’ total revenue is
n
Z σ
σ− amσ
~σ−βvð Þm
σ
d~σ ¼ n
Z a
0
σ−βv−
σx
m
 
dx:
21 While all themicrofoundations are consistent with our assumption that a consumer’s
willingness to pay for a product of type ~σ is equal to ~σ−βv, thewillingness to paymay also
be a nonlinear function. We further discuss this in Section 4.2 of the Online Appendix.
23 In the classic Salopmodel,more competition leads to lower prices. In a free TV regime,
prices are zero anyhow. However, broadcasters compete in program quality and in adver-
tising time. One can interpret advertising as an implicit price for the program; the result
that there is lower advertising in our model is similar to the result that prices are lower
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consumers' willingness to pay for a product accurately captures their
true beneﬁts from the product. If boundedly rational moods have an
impact on purchase behavior, or advertising is deceptive, consumers
may have losses on the product market since their perceived gains
from the products are not equal to their true gains. The magnitude of
these losses may depend both on advertising quantity and on television
program quality. In Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix, we study an
extension of our main model that takes these considerations into
account.
5. Results
5.1. Equilibrium
For a given advertising quantity ai N 0, the proﬁt-maximizing quality
is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
n
τ
σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
≡ri
¼ βn 1
N
þ vi−δai−u
τ
 
: ð9Þ
The left-hand side of Eq. (9) describes the marginal gain of broad-
caster i from increasing its program quality, on a per advertising spot
basis. Higher quality increases the number of viewers by n / τ, and on
each viewer, the broadcaster earns the price of an ad per viewer ri.
The right-hand side of Eq. (9) describes the broadcaster's marginal
costs from increasing its quality, per advertising spot. Higher quality
decreases the price of an ad per viewer by β, and the loss of revenue is
equal to β times the number of viewers.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the proﬁt-maximizing advertising
quantity is
∂πi
∂ai
¼−nδ
τ
riai−n
1
N
þ vi−δai−u
τ
 
σ
m
ai þ n 1N þ
vi−δai−u
τ
 
ri ¼ 0:
ð10Þ
If broadcaster i shows more ads, he loses viewers because of ad
aversion (the ﬁrst term), achieves a lower per-viewer price of ads
(the second term), but generates additional revenue on the additional
advertising quantity (the third term). The proﬁt-maximizing quantity
balances the marginal beneﬁts and costs. Our ﬁrst result characterizes
the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is no quantity restriction on advertising.
There is a symmetric equilibrium where for i = 1,…,N:
ai ¼
mβτ
N σ þmβδð Þ ; ð11Þ
vi ¼ σβ−
τ 2σ þmβδð Þ
N σ þmβδð Þ : ð12Þ
Inverse ad demand per viewer is ri = βτ/ N. The equilibrium proﬁt of
broadcasteri is
πi ¼ nmβ
2τ2
N3 σ þmβδð Þ
−F:
Eqs. (11) and (12) can easily be drived from the ﬁrst-order conditions
(9) and (10), assuming that all broadcasters behave symmetrically.22
Proving equilibrium existence is, however, somewhat more challenging22 This argument also shows that the equilibrium is unique in the class of all symmetric
equilibria whenever F N 0 (see Appendix A.1).for several interrelated reasons (see Section 5 of the Online Appendix).
The proﬁt functions are third-order polynomials in advertising quantity
and thus not everywhere concave; global optimality needs to be es-
tablished. Moreover, in the classic Salop (1979) model, undercutting
the rivals leads to a nonpositive proﬁt. In contrast, in our model, under-
cutting rivals can lead to a positive proﬁt; we thus need to establish
that the proﬁt from undercutting is smaller than the equilibrium proﬁt.
Proposition 1 implies that, when N increases or τ decreases,
there will be fewer ads and higher program quality. More competition
between broadcasters, be it through lower distances between two
adjacent broadcasters or due to better substitutability of their programs,
makes viewers better off.23 This is in line with the results in Ellman and
Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013).
Higher competition has two countervailing effects on the equilibrium
per-viewer price of advertising. On the one hand, it lowers advertising
quantity and thereby increases the per-viewer price. On the other
hand, it increases program quality and thereby decreases the per-viewer
price. Eq. (9) reveals that in any symmetric equilibrium,
nri
τ
≡
n
τ
σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
¼ nβ
N
:
Recall that the right-hand side can be interpreted as broadcaster i's mar-
ginal costs of program quality and equals β times the number of viewers
of the broadcaster. In any symmetric equilibrium, each broadcaster has
n/N viewers; thus, the marginal costs of quality decrease in N. At the
proﬁt-maximizing quality, the marginal beneﬁt of higher quality,
which is proportional to ri, must therefore also be lower. The model
thus predicts that more competition on the media market leads to a
lower price of an advertising spot. This prediction is in line with the
empirical results of Brown and Alexander (2005), who show that a
higher concentration on themediamarket goes alongwith higher adver-
tising prices.24
In contrast, in models where program quality is exogenous as in
Anderson and Coate (2005) or Choi (2006), more competition only
leads to a lower advertising quantity, and since inverse demand is fall-
ing in quantity, advertising prices increase. As noted, this prediction
seems at odds with the empirical evidence, and it is a puzzle in media
economics to explain the discrepancy. Anderson et al. (2012) and
Athey et al. (2013) propose explanations based on multi-homing
viewers. Our model offers a complementary explanation in a model
where viewers single home. Broadcasters compete for viewers not
only in advertising quantity but also in program quality. More competi-
tion on the broadcasting market leads to higher quality, and because of
the conﬂict of interest between viewers and advertisers, higher quality
decreases advertising prices.
Proposition 1 also shows that program quality increases in the mass
of advertisers m. To understand this result, note that for any given
advertising quantity, the proﬁt-maximizing program quality is deter-
mined by the trade-off described in Eq. (9): a higher program quality
attracts more viewers but leads to a lower price of advertising spots
per viewer.Whenm increases, ceteris paribus the price of an advertising
spot per viewer becomes higher; therefore, it pays to attract additional
viewers. This ﬁts nicely with the claim of some observers of today's
media markets that, as earning money through advertising is more
difﬁcult, be it because advertisers move online or simply because of
the general economic conditions, advertisers' interests have a bigger
impact on media content. The model may thus contribute to explainingin the Salop model.
24 Brown and Alexander (2005) estimate that a 20% increase in concentration in local
broadcast television markets would lead to a 9% increase in the per-viewer price of ads
(p. 336).
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see FCC, 2011).25
To start the welfare analysis, we investigate whether equilibrium
program quality and advertising are too high or too low from a welfare
perspective. That is, we consider exogenous changes of either program
quality or advertising quantity, marginally changing one while holding
the other constant.
Proposition 2. A small exogenous increase of programquality of all broad-
casters, holding the advertising quantities constant, increases consumer
surplus and decreases producer surplus. Moreover, welfare increases if
and only if
NNN^v :¼ mβ
2τ
σ þmβδ :
An increase of program quality means that the program content is
more in line with viewers' preferences, which is the reason why con-
sumer surplus increases. Producer surplus, on the other hand, decreases.
A higher program quality of broadcaster i has a business stealing effect
on the competing broadcasters: it induces viewers to switch from the
competitors to broadcaster i. The proﬁt-maximizing quality balances
this increase in viewers with the decrease in the prices of advertising
(see the discussion of Eq. (9) above). If the quality of all broadcasters
is increased simultaneously, as envisioned in Proposition 2, however,
viewers do not switch; therefore, the higher quality has only costs but
no beneﬁts for the broadcasters. Consequently, broadcasters' proﬁts
decrease. In other words, from the point of view of the broadcasters,
program quality has a negative externality due to the business stealing
effect, and the equilibrium quality is inefﬁciently high when compared
to the quality that maximizes the joint proﬁts of the broadcasters.
The effect of an increase of program quality on consumer surplus
does not depend on N. In contrast, its effect on producer surplus is
∂PS / ∂v=−nβa. Since the equilibrium value of advertising quantity a
is decreasing in the number of broadcasters, the effect on producer sur-
plus is less important (smaller in absolute value) when there are many
competing broadcasters. This observation explains the result
concerning welfare. When there are many independent broadcasters
(and similarly when the program substitutability is high), competition
for viewers is ﬁerce. Thus, in equilibrium there are relatively few ads,
and an increase of program quality does not reduce producer surplus
much. Hence the positive effect on consumer surplus dominates. Simi-
larly, if consumers are very ad averse, there are few ads in equilibrium
and an increase in quality does not reduce producer surplus much,
hence a small exogenous increase of program quality increases welfare.
Towards an understanding of the effect of a cap on advertising quan-
tity, we now consider the effect of a small exogenous decrease of adver-
tising quantity.
Proposition 3. A small exogenous decrease of advertising quantity of
all broadcasters, holding program qualities constant, increases consumer
surplus and decreases producer surplus. Moreover, welfare increases if
and only if
NNN^a :¼ βτδ :25 The result is related to the paradox noted by Ellman and Germano (2009) in their
model of newspaper competition that increasing the mass of advertisers eventually elim-
inates commercial media bias. Indeed, it is often argued that advertising revenues help to
have independent media (see, e.g., FCC, 2011). As argued above, this is partly reﬂected in
our model since a higher number of advertisers m implies a higher equilibrium program
quality. Moreover, it can be shown that in our model a cap makes it easier to bribe the
broadcasters to suppress information by bribes that are independent of the advertising
quantity. The risk of such political media capture must be traded off against the commer-
cial media bias we focus on.Consumer surplus decreases in advertising quantity since con-
sumers are ad averse. Producer surplus is increasing in advertising
quantity for the usual reason that a monopolist reduces quantities
below the efﬁcient level. Here, since viewers single-home, each broad-
caster is in a monopoly position with respect to the attention of his
viewers. When consumers are not very ad averse (δ sufﬁciently
small), reducing advertising while keeping program quality v constant
reduces welfare. This is in line with the results by Anderson and Coate
(2005): when the quality of the broadcasters' content is not at stake,
and consumers are not very ad averse, the equilibrium quantity of
advertising is too low. Conversely, if ad aversion is severe, there is too
much advertising in equilibrium.
Again, the effect on consumer surplus is independent ofN, while the
effect on producer surplus is less importantwhen competition is high. 26
To understand why, note that the effect of a small exogenous decrease
of advertising quantity on producer surplus is that the marginal adver-
tiser is crowded out. The corresponding loss of producer surplus equals
the willingness to pay of the marginal advertiser, which in turn equals
the equilibriumper-viewer price r of an advertising spot times the num-
ber of viewers n. As discussed above, r is decreasing in N and increasing
in τ. Therefore, the effect on producer surplus is small in absolute value
when competition is high.27
5.2. Effects of a cap on advertising
While the program quality may be hard to regulate,28 advertising
can be restricted. As reported in Section 2, many countries impose a
cap on the time devoted to ads on free TV. To analyze the effects of
such a cap, we need to take into consideration its effect on program
quality chosen by the broadcasters.29 We now consider the effect of a
quantity restriction on advertising ā that constraints all broadcasters
to choose ai ≤ ā. The following lemma studies the effect of a binding cap.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there is a cap
a∈ 0;
mβτ
N σ þmβδð Þ
 
on advertising. Then there is an equilibrium where broadcaster i = 1,…, N
chooses ai = ā and
vi ¼ σβ−
1
N
τ−
1
m
σ
β
a: ð13Þ
Proﬁt equals
πi ¼ naβτ
N2
−F:
As in the absence of a cap, equilibriumprogram quality is highwhen
competition is high. Moreover, the equilibrium per-viewer price of an
ad is decreasing in N and increasing in τ.
Equilibrium quality is decreasing in ā: the more stringent the cap
(i.e., the lower ā), the higher program quality. The main reason is that
a cap reduces advertising quantity, and thus, since inverse ad demand26 Formally, ∂PS∂a ¼ nðσ−βv− σam Þ. Evaluating the derivative at the equilibrium values of a
and v gives ∂PS∂a ¼ nβτN .
27 We point out that this result does not hold in models where program quality is exog-
enous, such as Anderson and Coate (2005). In thesemodels, an increase inN increases the
equilibriumprice of advertising. Correspondingly, the loss in producer surplus due to a de-
crease of advertising quantity is higher when there is ﬁerce competition on the media
market.
28 Moreover, a direct regulation of program quality may raise issues of free speech and
media capture by state authorities.
29 We focus on the effects of a cap on a free TVmarket. Of course, a cap (and similarly ad-
vertising taxes analyzed in Section 5.5) will also change the relative proﬁtability of free TV
and pay TV. See Section 6.1 for an analysis of pay TV.
Fig. 2. The critical values as a function of ad aversion δ.
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per viewer. Therefore, attracting additional viewers is more proﬁtable
for the broadcasters, and thus the equilibrium program content is
more in line with viewers' preferences. To understand the logic in
more detail, consider Fig. 1, which plots the marginal beneﬁts and
costs of quality from Eq. (9) as a function of vi. A cap shifts the inverse
ad demand function upward since the advertising quantity on broad-
caster i decreases; ceteris paribus, the price of an ad increases. Simulta-
neously, the competing broadcasters increase their quality, as predicted
by Eq. (13). When broadcaster i leaves its quality unchanged, i has less
viewers than before. Therefore, the marginal cost curve shifts down-
wards. These two reasons imply that broadcaster i has an incentive to
increase its program quality. For future reference, note that the effect
of the cap ā on equilibrium program quality is independent of N.
As noted in the introduction, the supply of news and current affairs
during peak hours by the biggest commercial broadcasters in several
European countries is drastically higher than that of the biggest com-
mercial broadcasters in the USA (Aalberg et al., 2010). This is in line
with our result that a cap increases program quality. Advertising quan-
tity is restricted in the European countries, but not in the USA. Other
things being equal, our model predicts that television content is more
viewer friendly in Europe, and indeed news belong to the viewers'
(but not advertisers') most preferred genres (Wilbur, 2008); our
model may thus contribute to an explanation of the cross-country
differences.
We now analyze the welfare effects of a “local” cap that reduces
advertising quantity slightly below the equilibrium level.
Proposition 4. A local cap on advertising increases consumer surplus but
decreases producer surplus. Welfare increases if and only if
NNN^cap :¼ 2σ þmβδð Þmβ
2τ
σ þmβδð Þ2
: ð14Þ
The critical values satisfy N^vbN^capbN^a.
The cap reduces advertising and increases program quality; both
effects increase consumer surplus and reduce producer surplus. The
effect on welfare hinges on the relative importance of these effects.
Note that, when NNN^a, reduced advertising quantity increases welfare,
and (since N^aNN^v) an increased program quality does as well; in this
case, a cap will surely increase welfare. When this sufﬁcient condition
is not satisﬁed, the direct effect of an advertising cap on welfare is neg-
ative; the total effect, however, may nevertheless still be positive.
Proposition 4 implies that, as should be expected, ad aversionmakes
itmore likely that a cap increaseswelfare.Moreover, whenever inequal-
ity (14) holds, the size of thewelfare gain through a local cap is increas-
ing in δ. However, even if consumers are not ad averse, a cap on
advertising can improve welfare.
Fig. 2 plots the cutoffs as a function of δ. A decrease in advertising
quantity, holding program quality constant, increases welfare above
N^a (the dotted line). Clearly, this can only happen if δ N 0, and the higherFig. 1. A broadcaster's marginal costs and beneﬁts from program quality without
(thin lines) and with (bold lines) a binding cap.δ, themore likely it is. Above N^v (the thin line), an increase in v holding a
constant increaseswelfare. Interestingly, the cutoffs differmost dramat-
ically when δ is small. Fig. 3 plots the cutoffs as a function ofm. N^a and
N^cap differ most when m is small. In times where advertisers move on-
line and m decreases, the quality enhancing effect of a cap becomes
more relevant.
The most surprising insight from Proposition 4 is that more compe-
tition, be it through a higher number of broadcasters (high N) or better
substitutability (low τ), makes it more likely that a local cap improves
welfare. Moreover, the quantitative importance of the welfare gains is
greater when there is more competition. This is surprising since, as
pointed out above, more competition increases equilibrium program
quality. Therefore, while competition is helpful to increase program
quality, it is not a substitute for regulating the market. Indeed, the mar-
ginal welfare gains from a local cap are increasing in N and decreasing
in τ; in this sense, there is a complementarity between regulation and
competition. Especially in a market with many independent broad-
casters, a cap on advertising may improve welfare. A policy implication
is that successful competition policy does not automatically make regu-
lation of the advertising quantities dispensable.
To understand the result, recall three observations pointed out
above: (i) the effects of a and v on consumer surplus does not depend
on N (ii) the effects of a and v on producer surplus gets smaller (in ab-
solute value) when N increases, and (iii) the effect of a cap on equilibri-
um program quality is independent of N. These observations imply that
the negative impact of a cap on producer surplus gets less importantFig. 3. The critical values as a function of the mass of advertisers m.
Fig. 4. The critical value for the optimal cap to be binding.
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affected; hence it is more likely that welfare increases.30
5.3. The optimal cap
This section studies the problem to maximize welfare by choosing a
cap ā subject to not changing the number of broadcasters,
max
a
W s:t: πi ¼ naβτ=N2≥ F:
For a given number of broadcasters, welfare is a convex function of ā:
consumer surplus is linear in ā, while producer surplus is quadratic in ā
(see (8) in combination with (13)). Therefore, it is either optimal to
have no cap on advertising, or a cap that brings proﬁts down to zero,
i.e., ā = N2F/(nβτ). In particular, inequality (14) is a sufﬁcient but not
a necessary condition for the optimal cap to be binding.
Fig. 4 illustrates. Broadcasters' proﬁts are positive below the zero
proﬁt line (in bold); the area above it is ruled out by the assumption
that equilibrium proﬁts (absent a cap) are positive. A cap that drives
broadcasters' proﬁts to zero is welfare maximizing below the thin
line; above it, laissez-faire is optimal. The two lines intersect only
once, at N^cap : on the zero proﬁt line a local cap is a zero proﬁt cap. Fig. 4
also illustrates that a cap can be optimal even when NbN^cap.
Proposition 5. There exists a critical value N^≤N^cap such that the welfare
maximizing cap is ā= N2F/(nβτ) if NNN^, and laissez-faire is optimal if N≤
N^. Moreover, N^ increases in F, m, β, and τ; N^ decreases in n, δ, and σ.
We now compare the results on the optimal cap with our results
from Section 5.2 on a local cap. While the welfare gains of a local cap
are increasing in N, the same is not everywhere true for the optimal
cap. The reason is that, with higher N, the nonnegativity constraint on
proﬁts is more stringent.31 On the other hand, the conditions under
which a cap raises welfare are qualitatively similar for a local cap and
the optimal cap. In particular, a more competitive broadcasting market,
or higher ad aversion, increases the attractiveness of a cap. There are
just two differences: the impact of the number of viewers n, and the
ﬁxed costs F. For a local cap, these do not matter. For the optimal cap,
the higher n, and the lower F, the more stringent a cap can be before in-
ducing exit; therefore, it is more likely that a zero proﬁt cap raises
welfare.
The optimal cap is not continuous in the parameters of themodel. In
Fig. 4, when we cross the thin line from the left, the optimal policy
jumps from laissez-faire to a cap that drives proﬁts down to zero. This
is somewhat disconcerting since the optimal policy is not robust with
respect to small perturbations. The discontinuity disappears, however,
once we consider endogenous entry.
5.4. Endogenous number of broadcasters
This section endogenizes the number N of broadcasters by assuming
free entry into the broadcasting market. We follow the standard ap-
proach to model entry in a two stage game. In stage 1, a large number
of potential broadcasters decide whether or not to enter. Upon entry,
a broadcaster has to invest the ﬁxed costs F. A broadcaster who stays30 We point out that this result hinges on endogenous program quality and a conﬂict of
interest between viewers and advertisers. Inmodels where program quality is exogenous,
such as Anderson and Coate (2005) or Choi (2006), more competition implies a higher
price of advertising, and correspondingly a larger negative impact of a cap on producer
surplus; thus, the marginal welfare gains of a local cap are smaller when competition is
intense.
31 To see this, suppose F is below the point where the two lines cross in Fig. 4. IfN is small
(to the left of the thin line), a cap lowers welfare. For intermediate values of N (between
the thin and the bold line), a cap increases welfare. On the bold line, the zero proﬁt cap
is equivalent to no cap at all, and the associated welfare gains are zero. Therefore, thewel-
fare gains from a cap are not monotone in N.out has a proﬁt of zero. In stage 2, broadcasters that have entered choose
their advertising quantity and program quality.
The number of broadcasters is then determined by the condition
that the broadcasters' proﬁts (given in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1)
equal zero.32 As shown above, for any ﬁxed number of broadcasters, a
cap on advertising lowers the proﬁts of the broadcasters. Therefore,
under free entry, a cap will reduce competition on the broadcasting
market.
Consider the welfare effects of a cap in the model with free entry.
Since the broadcasters' proﬁts equal zero by free entry, total proﬁts
equal the proﬁts of the advertisers. A cap reduces advertising quantity,
and by (7), advertisers' proﬁts decreases. Hence a cap decreases total
proﬁts, as in the model with an exogenous number of broadcasters.
Concerning consumer surplus, however, there are additional effects
that can reverse our ﬁndings above. A cap induces broadcasters to
exit, and exit has two negative consequences for consumers. First,
ceteris paribus, exit leads to a lower program quality. This counteracts
the quality enhancing effect of a cap studied in Section 5.2. The net effect
of a cap on program quality depends on the relative strength of these
effects. Second, when consumers have fewer broadcasters to choose
from, the match between consumers and programs becomes worse
(consumers have higher transportation costs). Indeed, a cap that is too
stringent decreases consumer surplus. Nevertheless, as our next result
shows, a local cap that slightly decreases the advertising quantity
below its laissez-faire equilibrium level increases consumer surplus.
Proposition 6. Consider the model with free entry on the broadcasting
market. (i) A local cap increases consumer surplus. (ii) Suppose that
Fb F^cap with exit :¼
27n σ þmβδð Þ5
512m2σ3β4τ
:
Then a local cap increases welfare, and there is a (uniquely deﬁned)
optimal cap a⁎, which is decreasing in δ and n, and increasing in τ and in
F. (iii) If F ≥ F^cap with exit; laissez-faire is optimal.
A comparison of Proposition 6 with Proposition 5 shows that our
results that better program substitutability, higher ad aversion, and a
larger viewer market increase the attractiveness of a cap, are robust to
endogenous entry. Moreover, with endogenous entry, the number of
broadcasters depends on the ﬁxed costs: the lower F, the more compe-
tition on the broadcasting market. Therefore our result that, with entry,
a cap improves welfare if F is sufﬁciently small, is similar to our result in
Section 5.3 that a cap improves welfare if N is sufﬁciently large.32 We follow Salop (1979) and assume that, after entry or exit, broadcasters automatical-
ly relocate such that they are equidistant.We ignore the integer constraint onN for conve-
nience. When ﬁxed costs are high or the cap on advertising is very stringent, only a
monopolist broadcaster may be active, or even all broadcasters may exit. We focus on
the case where some competition prevails.
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number of broadcasters, and the effects from the changing number of
broadcasters. Holding the number of broadcasters constant, a cap
lowers advertising quantity, which directly affects welfare, and induces
an increase in program quality that affects welfare, too. In addition to
that, a cap on advertising leads to a lower number of broadcasters. A
lowerN, in turn, affectswelfare directly by changing total transportation
costs and total ﬁxed costs, and induces a decrease in program quality
that affects welfare, too.
Depending on the parameters, endogenous entry can make it more
or less likely that a local cap increases welfare.33 When δ N 2σ / (3mβ),
the exit induced by a cap makes it more likely that a local cap increases
welfare.34 On the other hand,when δ b 2σ / (3mβ), the exit makes it less
likely that a local cap raises welfare. Therefore, with an endogenous
number of broadcasters, the case for a cap is stronger when ad aversion
is severe, and weaker when viewers are not very ad averse.35
It is not surprising that endogenous entry can tilt the desirability of a
cap in both ways. While in the classic Salop model, entry is excessive,
Choi (2006) has shown that both excessive and insufﬁcient entry are
possible in a Salop model of free TV (see also Crampes et al., 2009).
Our results indicate a related ambiguity in the present context. The pos-
sibility of excess entry on media markets should not be dismissed as
purely theoretical, however. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) show empiri-
cally that in the U.S. radio market, entry is excessive when evaluated
from the point of view of the radio stations and the advertisers. While
they cannot give a complete welfare analysis (due to lack of data on
the listeners' value of programming), their results indicate that the busi-
ness stealing effect of entry, which is one reason why entry may be ex-
cessive, is quantitatively important.5.5. The effects of an advertising tax
A tax on advertising seems to be a recurrent policy idea (Rauch,
2013). For example, the states of Iowa and Florida taxed advertising in
the late 1980s, and advertising taxes have recently been discussed in
Minnesota and Ohio.36 While many countries impose a cap on advertis-
ing quantities, however, Austria (with a tax rate of 10 %) is currently the
only OECD country that taxes advertising revenues. In this section, we
point out that a proportional tax on advertising revenues has quite
different implications than a cap in our model.37 We assume that the
tax revenue is redistributed lump sum to the consumers, and call net
consumer surplus the consumers' surplus before redistribution of tax
revenues, given in Eq. (5). Welfare is the sum of net consumer surplus,
tax revenue, and all proﬁts.33 A related but different concern is that content of higher qualitymay have higher costs.
As argued by Anderson (2007), a cap can for this reason reduce program quality.
34 In the laissez-faire equilibrium with free entry, the effect of a cap for given N can be
signed as follows. From Proposition 4, we know that, for givenN, a local cap raises welfare
if and only ifNNN^cap. SettingN equal to the equilibrium number of broadcasters under free
entry, and solving the inequality for F, reveals that the effects of a local cap for a given
number of broadcasters increasewelfare if and only if Fb F^cap :¼ nðσþmβδÞ
5
m2β4τð2σþmβδÞ3 :Taking en-
try into consideration, a cap raises welfare if Fb F^cap with exit. Straightforward calculations
show that, F^cap with exitN F^cap if and only if δ N 2σ / (3mβ).
35 The additional effects due to endogenous entry also determine how m affects the
probability that a cap raiseswelfare: F^cap with exit decreases inm if and only if δ b 2σ / (3mβ).
36 Relatedly, in the discussion on tax reform, U.S. House and Senate Committees intro-
duced proposals to change the tax deductibility of advertising. See Radelat (2013).
37 An excise tax based on the quantity of advertising, on the other hand, has similar ef-
fects as a cap. For given N, an excise tax leads to a lower advertising quantity, and higher
program quality; for any cap ā, an equivalent tax rate can be found that leads to the same
equilibrium advertising quantities and programqualities. Proﬁtswith the tax are lower by
the tax revenue than with the cap (unless tax revenues are redistributed lump sum to the
broadcasters, in which case the effect of the tax is exactly equal to that of the cap). There-
fore, an excise tax on advertising, that is, in the short run (for givenN), equivalent to a cap,
leads in the long run to higher concentration on the broadcasting market.Consider ﬁrst the case of an exogenously given number of broad-
casters. Since the marginal costs of broadcasters are equal to zero, a
tax on advertising revenue is a tax on variable proﬁts, and does not
change the equilibrium advertising quantity or program quality. Adver-
tisers' proﬁts and net consumer surplus are unaffected. The broad-
casters bear the burden of the tax since they are monopolists on the
advertising markets: due to single homing of consumers, each broad-
caster is the only one that can sell access to his viewers. The tax just
redistributes from the broadcasters to the government budget, andwel-
fare is constant. In contrast, under the conditions of Proposition 5, a cap
raises welfare. Quantity restrictions are a superior instrument to taxes
on this market.
With free entry, a tax on advertising revenues leads to exit, and
thereby to a higher advertising quantity and lower program quality.
Moreover, consumers have fewer broadcasters to choose from, and
thus higher transportation costs. These effects decrease net consumer
surplus.38 Interestingly, a tax on advertising increases advertisers'
proﬁts (and hence the sum of all proﬁts, too). At ﬁrst sight, this might
be a surprising result; it stems from the two-sidedness of the market.
The tax on advertising lowers the number of broadcasters and thus
softens the competition for audiences. Therefore, equilibrium advertis-
ing quantities are higher and equilibrium program quality is lower. By
Eq. (7), advertisers' proﬁts increase. In contrast, a cap decreases adver-
tising quantities and therefore advertisers' proﬁts, as well.
Proposition 7. With free entry on the broadcasting market, a small tax
on advertising decreases net consumer surplus and increases proﬁts. It
increases welfare if, and only if,
FN F^tax with exit :¼
729n σ þmβδð Þ5
64m2β4τ 4σ þ 3mβδð Þ3
:
Moreover, F^tax with exitb F^cap with exit if and only if δ N 2σ / (3mβ).
While a cap reduces advertising quantity, a tax on ad revenue
increases it. Moreover, the cap increases program quality, while the
tax reduces it. This explains why a tax decreases net consumer surplus
and increases proﬁts, while the effects of a cap are just the other way
round. Moreover, the conditions under which these instruments raise
welfare are qualitatively quite different. In particular, ﬁxed costs F, pro-
gram substitutability τ, the viewer market n, and ad aversion δ have the
opposite effect on the probability that a tax, or a cap, raise welfare. To
understand why, consider, for example, ﬁxed costs F. As explained in
Section 5.4 above, an advertising cap raises welfare if and only if F is
sufﬁciently low - just as in themodelwith exogenousN a local cap raises
welfare when N is sufﬁciently high. The intuition is that the cap raises v
and lowers a, and both increases welfare when there is a lot of competi-
tion on the broadcasting market (compare Propositions 2 and 3),
i.e., when F is low. Proposition 7 , in contrast, shows that a tax on advertis-
ing revenue raises welfare if and only if F is sufﬁciently high. The tax in-
creases a and lowers v, which increases welfare when there is not much
competition on the broadcasting market, i.e., when F is high. The tax
and the cap have in common, however, that they reduce the equilibrium
number of broadcasters. As reported above, if δ N 2σ / (3mβ), exitmakes it
more likely that a cap raiseswelfare. In this case F^tax with exit is smaller than
F^cap with exit; thus there is a range of parameters where F is between these
critical values, and both a cap and a tax raise welfare. Conversely, when δ
b 2σ / (3mβ), exit makes it less likely that welfare increases; then there is
a range of parameters where neither the cap nor the tax raises welfare.38 Since the tax revenue is redistributed to consumers, these negative effects have to be
balanced against the additional income from the redistribution of tax revenue. It can be
shown that a small tax on advertising increases the sum of net consumer surplus and
tax revenues if and only if F N 27n(σ+mβδ)2 / (64m2 β4τ).
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This section explores two extensions of our model: pay TV, and
consumers that differ in ad aversion and use ad avoidance technolo-
gies. (Extensions on producers that differ in how far they are affected
by television program quality and sector speciﬁc regulation, and
deceptive advertising are provided in the Online Appendix.) To
keep the discussion short, we assume N to be exogenous and focus
on the conditions under which a local cap raises welfare, as in
Section 5.2 above.
6.1. Pay TV
Our model gives additional support to results by Anderson and
Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) that a cap on advertising
does not improve welfare in a pay TV market. Indeed, in a pay TV
market, program quality will not be too low from a welfare perspec-
tive. To see this, suppose broadcaster i charges a price pi. A viewer
located at distance x from broadcaster i has utility w + vi − τx −
δai − pi from watching the broadcaster. The proﬁt of the broadcast-
er is39
πi ¼ n
1
N
þ vi−δai−pi−u
τ
 
pi þ σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
ai
 
−F;
when all other broadcasters j ≠ i offer the viewers the same gross of
transportation costs utility u = vj − δaj − pj. Consider the proﬁt-
maximizing choice of vi and pi for given ai. Increasing both vi and
pi by the same amount increases proﬁts if aiβ b 1. It is natural to as-
sume that there is some upper bound v on program quality above
which it cannot be improved. Whenever pi N 0 in equilibrium, the
broadcaster will increase its program quality as much as possible.
This result ﬁts the claim by Brown and Cavazos (2005) that the
business strategy of the pay TV broadcaster HBO was to air explicit-
ly darker, advertiser unfriendly material.40
6.2. Ad avoidance technologies
As argued in Section 2, viewers can today easily avoid contact
with advertisements by using ad avoidance technologies such as ad
blockers or digital video recorders. The traditional argument for a
cap on advertising thus may seem less compelling: any viewer who
is exposed to ads reveals by his behavior that he is not very ad averse.
The point made in this paper, that a cap may improve welfare even if
viewers do not directly suffer from exposure to ads, however, gets
reinforced when there are ad averse viewers who use ad avoidance
technologies.
To illustrate this, we consider an extension where there are two
types of consumers: a mass n1 of consumers who are intrinsically ad
neutral (δ=0), and a mass n2= n− n1who are intrinsically ad averse
and have a δ N 0. Suppose that ad aversion is independent of the location
of a consumer; both ad averse and ad neutral consumers are distributed
uniformly on the circle. Moreover, suppose that ad avoidance technolo-
gies are freely available. Then viewers with δ N 0 use ad avoidance tech-
nologies, and thus effectively no consumer is directly negatively affected
by ads.
Only those viewers who are intrinsically ad neutral are reached by
ads, and only those play a role in the calculations of the media outlets
and the advertisers. The other ones are affected, however, by the pro-
gram quality chosen by the broadcasters. We can model this situation39 As above, this implicitly assumes that themarket share of broadcaster i is between ze-
ro and one, inverse ad demand is positive, and broadcaster i does not undercut its rivals.
40 Note, however, that the result is driven by the assumption that all viewers have the
same marginal rate of substitution between money and program quality. If viewers differ
in these respects, the commercialmedia biasmay reappear in equilibriumeven in a pay TV
regime, as in Ellman and Germano (2009).as above by setting δ= 0, replacing n by n1 in the formulas for proﬁts
and producer surplus, and adding a term n2 (w + v)− n2τ / (4 N) to
the consumer surplus to account for the consumers who use ad avoid-
ance technologies. Thus, as compared to a situation where everyone is
intrinsically ad neutral, there is an additional welfare beneﬁt from
higher programquality: the consumers using ad avoidance technologies
do not ﬁgure in the broadcasters' or advertisers' decisions, but enjoy a
higher program quality as well. For the welfare comparison in
Proposition 4, this implies that the condition for when a local cap
improves welfare (14) becomes less strict than when every consumer
is intrinsically ad neutral.417. Conclusion
This paper has argued that a cap on advertising in free-to-air televi-
sion (or other advertising fundedmedia) drives up the per-viewer price
of advertising spots and thus induces the media to choose more viewer
friendly program content. Due to this effect on non-advertising content
an advertising cap can increase welfare, even when viewers are not
directly ad averse or can use ad avoidance technologies. Competition
between broadcasters helps overcoming commercial media bias.
There is, however, a complementarity between competition and regula-
tion: on a more competitive broadcasting market, the marginal welfare
gains from a cap are higher. The paper also shows that endogenous
entry into the broadcastingmarket can tilt the desirability of advertising
caps in either way, but does not overturn the main insights from the
model. Moreover, the paper compared advertising caps with taxes on
advertising revenue, arguing that these two policy instruments are
quite different in the present context.
We used the Salop model with linear transportation costs as our
model of television viewing behavior. As we show in Section 4.1 of
the Online Appendix, however, our results concerning an exogenous
number of broadcasters extend to a far more general setting, which
comprises other well known discrete choice models such as the Logit
model. In particular, the conditions under which a local cap raises
welfare are qualitatively similar, and the optimal cap has the same
qualitative properties, in these alternativemodels of television viewing.
An interesting question for further research is to generalize the analysis
of entry beyond the Salop model.
Our model assumed that higher program quality reduces the will-
ingness to pay of all advertisers by the same amount. We discuss two
extensions in the Online Appendix that relax this assumption. First, in
Section 3.2 of the Online Appendix, we study an extension where only
some advertisers prefer low quality programs, while others are indiffer-
ent. If advertising demand from the latter type of advertisers is sufﬁ-
ciently high, the market solves the problem of commercial media bias.
Otherwise, however, a cap may raise welfare in a larger set of circum-
stances, and the welfare gains from a cap may be higher, than in our
main model. The reason is that, in the extension, the higher program
quality induced by the cap does not decrease the proﬁts of those adver-
tisers who are indifferent over program quality, thus the negative effect
of a cap on producer surplus is less important. In addition to that, the ex-
tended setting allows to study sector speciﬁc regulations such as, for ex-
ample, a ban on tobacco advertising, and shows they can be even more
beneﬁcial.
Second, we discuss an extensionwhere the effect of programquality
on advertising demand depends on the quality of the advertised goods.
Plausibly, producers of high-quality goods have less to lose from high
programquality. An advertising cap implies that themarginal advertiser
sells a product of higher quality and thus is less affected by an increase
in program quality. We show in Section 4.2 of the Online Appendix that
this reinforces the effect of the cap on program quality: with a cap,
inverse advertising demand is less sensitive to program quality;41 Note that the condition does not depend on n, so replacing n by n1 does not affect it.
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other nonlinearities in consumers' utility from watching television, and
in the inverse demand for advertising spots.
Our welfare analysis is based on the view that advertising is
informative, and on a rational choice model of consumer behavior.
Of course, these assumptions are doubtful when purchase decisions
are boundedly rational, or when advertising is suggestive or
deceptive. In Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix, we study an
extension of our model that takes these issues into account and
show that deceptive advertising makes the case for an advertising
cap stronger.
The size and relative importance of the effects we identify is
ultimately an empirical question. The model has several testableempirical implications, such as the comparative static of equilibri-
um advertising quantity and program quality with respect to com-
petition on the television market, and with respect to the mass of
advertisers. A particularly interesting exercise for future research
would be to empirically study the effect of an advertising cap on
program content. Moreover, our model considered a commercial
television market. Public service broadcasters may be less suscepti-
ble to commercial media biased insofar as their funding is secured
largely independent from advertising revenues. Since public service
broadcasters also compete for viewers' attention, their presence
may impact the program content of commercial broadcasters as
well. Studying these interdependencies is an interesting topic for
future research.Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Here we show that, for any F N 0, if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it is given by Eqs. (11) and (12). In Section 5 of the Online Appendix, we
establish that Eqs. (11) and (12) indeed constitute an equilibrium.
Suppose that FN 0. In any symmetric equilibrium, aiN 0 for otherwise broadcastersmake losses F. Therefore, theﬁrst-order conditions (9) and (10) have
to hold. By symmetry (ai = aj and vi = vj) these conditions simplify to
1
τ
σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
−
β
N
¼ 0;
−
δ
τ
σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
ai−
1
N
σ
m
ai þ 1N σ−βvi−
σai
m
 
¼ 0:
It is easily veriﬁed that the unique solution to these equations is given by Eqs. (11) and (12).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
From Eq. (5),
∂CS
∂v
¼ nN0: ð15Þ
Moreover, from Eq. (6),
∂PS
∂v
¼−nβa ð16Þ
which is strictly smaller than zero since a N 0 in equilibrium.
Finally, consider the marginal effect of v on welfareW,
∂W
∂v
¼ ∂CS
∂v
þ ∂PS
∂v
¼ n−nβa:
Inserting the equilibrium value of a gives
∂W
∂v
¼ n− nmβ
2τ
N σ þmβδð Þ ;
which is strictly positive if and only if NNN^v:
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
From Eq. (5),
∂CS
∂a
¼−δnb0: ð17Þ
Moreover, from Eq. (6),
∂PS
∂a
¼ n σ−βv−σa
m
 
N0; ð18Þ
which is strictly positive in equilibrium. The marginal effect of a on welfare is
∂W
∂a
¼ ∂CS
∂a
þ ∂PS
∂a
¼−δnþ n σ−βv−σa
m
 
:
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∂W
∂a
¼−δnþ 1
N
nβτ;
which is strictly negative if and only if NNN^a.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, and hence omitted.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
The marginal effect of ā on CS is given by
dCS
da
¼ ∂CS
∂a
þ ∂CS
∂v
dv
da
:
From Lemma 1 it follows that
dv
da
¼− 1
m
σ
β
; ð19Þ
so from Eqs. (15), (17), and (19),
dCS
da
¼−δn− σn
mβ
b 0:
The marginal effect of ā on the producer surplus PS is given by
dPS
da
¼ ∂PS
∂a
þ ∂PS
∂v
dv
da
:
From Eqs. (16), (18), and (19), it follows that
dPS
da
¼ n σ−βvð Þ;
which is strictly positive since in equilibrium both inverse ad demand and advertising quantity are strictly positive, i.e., σ− βv N σa / m N 0.
Finally, consider the effect of ā on welfare W,
dW
da
¼ dCS
da
þ dPS
da
¼−δn− σn
mβ
þ n σ−βvð Þ:
From inserting the equilibrium value of v from Proposition 1, it follows that the total effect of ā onW is
dW
da
¼−δn− σn
mβ
þ nβ τ 2σ þmβδð Þ
N σ þmβδð Þ
which is strictly negative if and only if NNN^cap:
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
By inserting the equilibrium value of a and v into the welfare function, it follows that the laissez-faire welfareWLF, that is achieved when there is
no cap, equals
WLF ¼ n wþ σ
β
−
τ 2σ þmβδð Þ
N σ þmβδð Þ −δ
mβτ
N σ þmβδð Þ
 
−
nτ
4N
þ n
Z mβτ
N σþmβδð Þ
0
σ−β
σ
β
−
τ 2σ þmβδð Þ
N σ þmβδð Þ
 
−
σx
m
 
dx−NF:
With a cap ā= N2F/(nβτ), welfare equals
Wcap ¼ n wþ σ
β
−
1
N
τ−
1
m
σ
β
N2 F
nβτ
−δ
N2 F
nβτ
 !
−
nτ
4N
þ n
Z N2 F
nβτ
0
σ−β
σ
β
−
1
N
τ−
1
m
σ
β
N2 F
nβτ
 !
−
σx
m
 !
dx−NF:
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Wcap−WLF ¼
FN3 σ þmβδð Þ−mnβ2τ2
 
mnβ2τ2 3σ þ 2mβδð Þ þ N σ þmβδð Þ FN2σ−2nτ σ þmβδð Þ
  
2N2mnβ2τ2 σ þmβδð Þ2
:
Since by assumption laissez-faire equilibrium proﬁts (given in Proposition 1) are positive, FN3 (σ+mβδ) bmnβ2τ2. Therefore,Wcap NWLF if and
only if
mnβ2τ2 3σ þ 2mβδð Þ þ N σ þmβδð Þ FN2σ−2nτ σ þmβδð Þ
 
b0
or, equivalently,
Fb F^ Nð Þ :¼ 2Nnτ σ þmβδð Þ
2−mnβ2τ2 3σ þ 2mβδð Þ
N3σ σ þmβδð Þ :
For anyNNN^cap, Proposition 4 has already established that a local cap raises welfare and thus clearlyWcap NWLF. For the rest of the proof, consider
the case where N≤N^cap:
By differentiating F^ðNÞwith respect toN, it can be shown that for allN≤N^cap; F^ðNÞ is strictly increasing inN. Therefore, for allN≤N^cap, one can invert
F^ðNÞ to ﬁnd a strictly increasing function N^ðFÞ such that Fb F^ðNÞ if and only ifNNN^ðFÞ. The remaining properties of N^ðFÞ can be shown by the implicit
function rule, taking into account that, in the relevant range, N^ð0Þ≤N≤N^cap.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 6
Without a cap on advertising, the number of ﬁrms and quantities of advertising are, in equilibrium,
N ¼ NL F :¼ nmβ
2τ2
F σ þmβδð Þ
 !1
3
;
a ¼ aL F :¼ mβτ
nmβ 2τ 2
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3 σ þmβδð Þ
¼ βτFm
2
n σ þmβδð Þ2
 !1
3
:
With a binding cap ā, the number of ﬁrms equals N ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðnaβτÞ=Fp :
Substituting v from Lemma 1 in Eq. (5), and inserting the equilibrium number of ﬁrms N ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðnaβτÞ=Fp , shows that consumer surplus is
CS að Þ ¼ n wþ σ
β
−
σ
mβ
a−δa
 
−
5
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nτF
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aβ
p :
As noted in themain text, in contrast to the casewith a constant number of broadcasters, with free entry a cap on advertising does not necessarily
increase CS. Indeed,
CS0 að Þ ¼− nσ
mβ
−nδþ 5
8
1
a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fnτ
β
s
ð20Þ
is positive when ā is sufﬁciently small; thus, when a very stringent cap is relaxed, viewers become better off.
To prove part (i) of Proposition 6, evaluate Eq. (20) at the laissez-faire equilibrium value of advertising. After straightforward calculations,
CS0 aL F
 	 ¼− nσ
mβ
−nδþ 5
8
n σ þmβδð Þ
mβ
¼−3n σ þmβδð Þ
8mβ
b0:
Therefore, a local cap improves consumer surplus.
It remains prove parts (ii) and (iii). Summing proﬁts and consumer surplus shows that, given a binding cap ā, welfare equals
W að Þ ¼ n wþ σ
β
−
σ
mβ
a−δa
 
−
5
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nτF
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aβ
p þ 1
2
a2
m
nσ : ð21Þ
A welfare maximizing planner maximizesW(ā) by choosing a cap ā ≤ aLF.42 Here, choosing ā= aLF is equivalent to laissez-faire, i.e., imposing no
cap at all.
Differentiating Eq. (21),
W 0 að Þ ¼− nσ
mβ
−nδþ 5
8
1
a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fnτ
β
s
þ a
m
nσ :42 Equation (21) presupposes that N ≥ 2. Of course, a cap that is too stringent will eliminate competition on the broadcasting market. As stated above, we focus on the case where some
competition prevails.
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W 0 aLF
 	 ¼− nσ
mβ
−nδþ 5
8
n σ þmβδð Þ
mβ
þ F13 βτð Þ
1
3n
2
3σ
σ þmβδð Þ 23m 13
;
which is strictly negative if and only if
Fb
nσ
mβ þ nδ− 58 n σþmβδð Þmβ
 
σ þmβδð Þ23m 13
βτð Þ 13n 23σ
0
@
1
A
3
¼ F^cap with exit:
This shows that a local cap improves welfare if and only if Fb F^cap with exit:
Note thatW fulﬁlls the Inada condition limā→ 0W′(ā)=∞; hence,W′(ā) N 0 for sufﬁciently small ā. If a binding cap ā b aLF is optimal, it must fulﬁll
the ﬁrst-order condition W′(ā) = 0. Although W is not necessarily concave on (0, aLF]; nevertheless, a sufﬁcient second-order condition (called
pseudo-concavity) holds:
Lemma 2. Suppose that W′(a0)= 0 for some a0 ∈ (0,aLF). Then (i) W″(a0) b 0. Moreover, (ii) W′(a) N 0 for all a b a0 and W′(a) b 0 whenever
a0 b a b a
LF.
Proof. DifferentiatingW′(a),
W″ að Þ ¼− 15
16a
5
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
F
n
β
τ
r
þ nσ
m
:
Suppose thatW′(a0)= 0 and 0 b a0 b aLF. ThenW″(a0) has the same sign as g (a0), where
g að Þ :¼ aW″ að Þ−W 0 að Þ ¼− 25
16a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fnτ
β
s
þ nσ
mβ
þ nδ:
Note that g′ (a) N 0 and
g aL F
 	 ¼− 25
16 mβτ
nmβ 2τ 2
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3
σþmβδð Þ
0
B@
1
CA
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fnτ
β
s
þ nσ
mβ
þ nδ ¼− 9
16m
n
β
σ þmβδð Þb0:
It follows that g (a0) b 0 and henceW″(a0) b 0. This establishes (i). Part (ii) is obvious from (i). ■
To complete the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 6, suppose that Fb F^cap with exit. By the intermediate value theorem sinceW′(ā) N 0 for sufﬁciently
small ā andW′(aLF) b 0, there exists some a⁎ ∈ (0, aLF) such thatW′(a⁎)= 0. By Lemma 2,W has a strict global maximum at a⁎. For the comparative
statics of the optimal cap, recall that W′(a⁎)= 0 andW″(a⁎) b 0. By the implicit function rule, the sign of dadδ is equal to the sign of
∂W 0ðaÞ
∂δ ¼−nb0.
Similarly, ∂∂τW
0ðaÞN0 and ∂∂F W 0ðaÞN0; thus, a⁎ is increasing in τ and in F. Moreover,
∂
∂n
W 0 að Þ ¼ ∂
∂n
n −
σ
mβ
−δþ 5
8
1
a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fτ
βn
s
þ a
m
σ
 ! !
¼ − σ
mβ
−δþ 5
8
1
a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fτ
βn
s
þ a
m
σ
 !
−
5
16
1
a
3
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Fτ
βn
s
:
Note that the bracket isW′(ā)/n and thus zero when evaluated at a⁎. It follows that ∂∂nW
0ðaÞb0 and a⁎ is decreasing in n.
To prove part (iii) of Proposition 6, suppose that F ≥ F^cap with exit. ThenW′(a
LF) ≥ 0. Lemma 2 implies thatW′(ā) N 0 for all ā b aLF. Thus, the optimal
policy is laissez-faire.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose there is a tax t on advertising revenue. The proﬁt of broadcaster i equals
πi ¼ n
1
N
þ vi−δai−u
τ
 
σ−βvi−
σ
m
ai
 
ai 1−tð Þ−F:
For given N, the equilibrium advertising quantity a, program quality v, are as given in Proposition 1 above. Inverse ad demand per viewer equals
r= βτ / N and net of taxes (1− t) βτ / N. The equilibrium proﬁt of a broadcaster is
πi ¼
nmβ 2τ 2
N 3 σ þmβδð Þ 1−tð Þ−F:
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N ¼ nmβ
2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σ þmβδð Þ
 !1
3
:
Therefore, in equilibrium
a ¼ mβτ
nmβ 2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3 σ þmβδð Þ
;
v ¼ σ
β
−
τ 2σ þmβδð Þ
nmβ 2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3 σ þmβδð Þ
:
Moreover, net consumer surplus (i.e., before redistribution of tax revenues) is
CSnet ¼ n wþ v−δað Þ− nτ4N
¼ nwþ nσ
β
−
2τn
nmβ 2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3
−
nτ
4 nmβ
2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3
:
ð22Þ
Thus, CSnet is decreasing in t. Advertiser proﬁts equals a2nσ / (2m) (see Eq. (8)). Inserting the equilibrium value of a gives
1
2
a2
m
nσ ¼ 1
2
nσ
m
mβτ
nmβ 2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3 σ þmβδð Þ
0
BB@
1
CCA
2
: ð23Þ
Thus, advertiser proﬁts are increasing in t. Tax revenue T is given by T= nrat. In equilibrium,
T ¼ nm βτð Þ
2t
nmβ 2τ 2 1−tð Þ
F σþmβδð Þ
 2
3 σ þmβδð Þ
: ð24Þ
Welfare isW= CSnet + PS− NF + T. Note that, because of free entry, PS− NF equals advertisers' proﬁts (23).
Inserting Eqs. (22), (23), and (24), intoW, differentiating with respect to t, and evaluating at t= 0, shows that
∂W
∂t t¼0
j ¼
F mnβ
2τ 2
F σþmβδð Þ
 1
3
12mβ 2τ σ þmβδð Þ 4mβ
2τ 4σ þ 3mβδð Þ− mnβ
2τ 2
F σ þmβδð Þ
 1
3
9 σ þmβδð Þ2
 !
:
Therefore,W is increasing in t if and only if FN F^tax with exit:
To complete the proof, straightforward calculation of F^cap with exit− F^ tax with exit shows that F^tax with exitb F^cap with exit if and only if δ N 2σ / (3mβ).Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.004.
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